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Impacts of flat rates and digressive schemes on the distribution of 
Direct Payments in the EU 
 
Abstract  
The  Mid-Term  Review  and  the  Health  Check  reforms  of  the  EU’s  Common  Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) include numerous options for national implementation of the Single Payment 
Scheme.  After  the  far-reaching  decoupling  of  Direct  Payments,  a  further  reform  of  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  is  necessary  with  respect  to  the  financial  guidelines  to  be 
established for the period after 2013. Referring to Germany, the principles of the hybrid and 
regional models and their effects on the distribution of Direct Payments are shown. With 
regard to future CAP, the impacts of alternative payment options are analysed based on farm 
individual FADN data of EU-27. Options of digressive premium schemes, including capping 
with regard to labour input and regionalised or EU-wide flat rates are analysed.  
 
Keywords: CAP, Direct Payments, Decoupling, Modulation, FADN  
JEL classification: Q12, Q18 
1.  INTRODUCTION  
Direct  Payments  (DP)  were  introduced  by  the  McSharry  reform  of  the  Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992. At first they were targeted to compensate for income 
losses  due  to  reduced  price  support  in  the  arable  crops  and  beef  sector.  Further,  Direct 
Payment schemes were extended to other sectors and decoupled in the Mid-term review and 
the Health Check via the Single Payment Scheme (SPS).  
The  Direct  Payment  budget  is  restricted  by  the  financial  guidelines  until  2013. 
Negotiations aiming at the preparation of CAP after 2013 are going on. A communication of 
the EU Commission (2010a) on the future CAP was submitted in November 2010. National 
and  scientific  positions  range  from  the  maintenance  or  slight  modification  of  existing 
schemes, simplification, further harmonisation of Direct Payment levels between Member 
States  (MS),  and  partial  or  full  transformation  in  favour  of  Pillar-II  (Dutch  Ministry  of 
Agriculture, 2008; Bureau and Mahé, 2008; Heißenhuber et al., 2008, Zahrnt, 2008, 2009). A 
far-reaching proposal has been worked out by an expert group involved in a study for the 
Committee  on  Agriculture  and  Rural  Development  of  the  European  Parliament,  with  a 
transitory  payment  scheme  until  2020,  and  a  general  reorientation  towards  public  goods 
afterwards (Bureau et al., 2010).  
Referring to proposals of future CAP, the paper aims to analyse modifications of the 
Direct Payment scheme with regard to harmonisation within and between Member States and 
between farm sizes. The following options are considered: Flat rates referring to eligible 
areas, premium digression referring to Direct Payment level and labour input of farms as well 
as global budget cuts. The analysis is based on micro-level simulations using the EU Farm 
Accounting Data Network (FADN) as a data base.  
The  paper  is  structured  as  follows:  In  Chapter  2  the  method,  data  and  scenario 
assumptions  as  well  as  the  distribution  of  Direct  Payments  are  described.  In  Chapter  3 
impacts of different decoupling schemes are analysed. The German Regional Model is taken EAAE Congress 2011 
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as an example of transforming historic entitlements into regionalised ones. Then, impacts of 
above mentioned Direct Payment options are shown at Member State level, EU-15 and the 
new Member States. The paper closes with some recommendations.  
2.  MODELLING APPROACH, DATA AND SCENARIOS  
The  analysis  of  alternative  Direct  Payment  options  goes  back  to  a  study  for  the 
Committee on Agriculture and Rural Development of the European Parliament (Bureau et al., 
2010)  proposing  a  two-step  procedure: a) progressive reduction of Pillar-I until 2020, b) 
increasing budget for Pillar-II, i.e., public money for the provision of public goods. Based on 
the authors’ contribution, the modelling approach has been extended to deal with options 
included in the communication of the Commission (2010a) for a further reform of CAP after 
2013.  Option  2  of  this  proposal  –  referring  to  Direct  Payments  -  includes  the  following 
measures under the guideline of a fairer distribution between the Member States:  
·  a base payment serving as income support  
·  a  compulsory  complementary  aid  with  regard  to  environmental  measures,  partly 
compensating for additional costs  
·  complementary payments to balance more specially natural restrictions  
·  an optional coupled support component for special sectors and regions 
·  introduction of a new regulation for small farms  
·  capping of the basic rate, while also considering the contribution of large farms to rural 
employment. 
These measures are not concrete enough for quantitative modelling. A referring paper 
published together with the communication of the Commission on CAP 2103 gives no signals 
on budget cuts (EU-Commission 2010b), although it is not reasonable to expect that the CAP 
budget remains unchanged.  
Complementary to theoretical or conceptual papers (i.e., Wissenschaftlicher Beirat für 
Agrarpolitik, 2010, Bureau and Mahé 2008, Dutch Ministry, 2008) we try to contribute to this 
discussion  by  quantitative assessments of policy options based on simulations using EU-
FADN data.  
The first item of the proposal of the EU Commission can be interpreted as a base 
payment, i.e. defined as an EU-wide flat rate below present levels (cf. i.e. Heißenhuber et al., 
2008). The second item goes in the direction of Pillar-II measures, where budget might be 
derived by the difference of the existing and the base payments. It’s an open question if this 
new Pillar-II is complementary to existing Pillar-II programs with national co-financing and 
multi-annual contracts – and last but not least, if the income effects of these subsidies would 
be within the boundary set by WTO (Swinbank and Tranter 2005). The latter items can be 
interpreted as digressive payments referring to premium volume of farms and with regard to 
labour input. An improvement of the relative position of small farms could be reached by flat 
rates, i.e. per hectare (ha) at the Member State level or EU-wide, and a franchise excluding 
low Direct Payment levels from digression. An alternative would be the use of the existing 
Modulation scheme combined with ceilings referring to labour input. Capping measures were 
proposed  several  times  by  the  EU  Commission  in  previous  reforms  (Kleinhanss  and EAAE Congress 2011 
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Manegold, 1998), but were never established due to strong opposition, especially from the 
German  government. However, such measures do exist in the US Farm Bill (Thompson, 
2010).  
The harmonisation of Direct Payments between regions and Member States could be 
realised  via  regionalised  flat  rates  as  in  Germany  (BMELV,  2006)  and  England.  In  the 
analysis we assume unified flat rates at the Member State or EU-wide levels.
2 This could be 
combined with premium digression per farm, depending on premium level and labour input. 
We assume a doubling of parameters of the existing Modulation scheme (20 % > 5 T€
3 + 8 % 
> 300 T€), completed by capping referring to labour input (<= 15 T€ of DP per Agricultural 
Working Unit (AWU) for Direct Payments levels of farms > 50 T€).
4 The latter should be 
defined to reference levels of AWU in the past, i.e., the year before policy decision.  
A last option, not considered in the communication of the Commission, is a general 
reduction of the Pillar-I budget. Cuts of CAP budget were mentioned in a so-called non-paper 
of the Commission in 2009. Alternatively we assume a 20 % reduction of the budget for 
Direct Payments. Budget cuts seem to be reasonable with regard to budget needs for future 
global policy targets (i.e., environment, biodiversity, etc). Scenarios with constant budget are 
defined as Sc_Bcons, those with budget cuts as Sc_B-20%.  
2.1 Simulation approach and data 
Based on 2007 FADN data, simulations
5 were realised referring to the year 2013. A 
comparative static simulation model has been developed to assess impacts of different Direct 
Payment schemes on the premium level and income. In a first step, gross premium levels 
(excluding compulsory and voluntary Modulation) are calculated for 2007. Then, a projection 
of  premiums  for  2013  is  made,  including  the  regional  implementation  of  decoupling  in 
Germany and England, as well as the upgrading of premium levels in the new Member States. 
Target year for the analysis is 2013, assuming a full phasing-in of Direct Payments also in 
Bulgaria  and  Romania.  Premium  totals  per  Member  State  derived  from  EU-FADN  are 
calibrated to national premium budgets as well as with regard to Used Agricultural Areas 
(UAA) represented by FADN.
6  
Partial impacts of above-mentioned scenarios are derived referring to projected (Gross) 
Direct Payments under national implementation of decoupling (excluding Modulation). The 
results  are  weighted  with  farm  individual  weighting  factors  and  aggregated  to  sector 
accounts.  
The premium budget of EU-27 for Pillar-I amounts to 46 billion € in 2013.
7 Flat rates 
per ha of UAA derived from budget and statistical data vary between 83 €/ha in Latvia and 
575 €/ha in Greece. An EU-wide uniform flat rate would amount to 266.3 €/ha.  
                                                       
2  Regional or EU-uniform flat rates per hectare are derived from the premium budget of EU member states or EU-27 together. 
3  T = thousand 
4  Parameters are determined by the author; variations can easily be introduced in the simulation model.  
5    The  data  base  includes  roughly  81  T  farms,  representing  roughly  5.4  million  farms  in  the  EU-27;  see 
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/ index_en.cfm. 
6  Ongoing implementation of the Health Check decisions and remaining steps of the reforms of the Common market regimes for 
sugar, tobacco, olive oil, cotton, fruit and vegetables are implicitly considered by calibration. 
7  Direct Payment plafond for Bulgaria and Romania in 2016 is assumed to be implemented in 2013. EAAE Congress 2011 
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2.2 Distribution of Direct Payments 
Before  presenting  the  results  of  scenario  analysis,  we  give  a  brief  overview  on 
distribution of Direct Payments. Usually, Lorenz curves or Gini coefficients are used for 
distributional issues (Butault and Lerouvillois, 1999). Based on own experiences, the change 
of these indicators is not specific enough to show changes induced by underlying scenarios; 
therefore we apply distributional charts.  
By the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) or the Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) 
Direct Payments are de-facto transformed into area (ha) based entitlements; the same would 
hold  for  flat  rates  per  Member  State  or  EU-wide.  Therefore  the  distribution  of  Direct 
Payment levels per ha is of interest (Figure 1). Distribution of historical or hybrid models are 
represented by R-EU-15 (EU-15 excl. Germany) and the hypothetical German (DEU) hybrid 
model. The distributions are quite similar, while slightly skewed to the left in R-EU-15 and 
skewed towards the right in Germany. Applying mainly SAPS in the new Member States, 
half of Direct Payments received are between 250 and 300 €/ha, another 12 % are 300 and 
350 €/ha and the remaining in groups with low entitlement levels. With the regional model in 
Germany, the distribution becomes very tight with 40 and 55 % for entitlement classes 300 
and 400 €/ha. 
 
Figure 1. Distribution of DP/ha 





























With regard to the communication of the EU-Commission, the distribution of Direct 
Payments related to labour input is of interest. Referring to the capping scheme defined in the 
scenarios, only farms > 50 T€ and Direct Payments / AWU > 15 T€ would be affected. In 
total, 28 % of Direct Payment volume would be affected by this measure (see Chapter 3.3).  
3.  EFFECTS OF FLAT RATES AND DIGRESSIVE SCHEMES 
To get an idea of the distribution effects of regional flat rates, changes of premiums are 
shown  for  the  implementation  of  the  regional  model  in  Germany  in  comparison  to  a 
projection of the hybrid model based on 2007 data. In a next step we discuss combined EAAE Congress 2011 
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effects  of  unified  flat  rates per Member States and EU-wide with premia digression and 
global budget cuts.  
3.1.  The national implementation of SPS in Germany  
In  Germany,  the  SPS  was implemented in 2005 with an almost full decoupling of 
Direct Payments. In a first step, a regional adjustment of premium volume was carried out 
between the Laender, changing the former Laender budgets by -5 % to +14 %. Regionalised 
area-related entitlement levels are combined with farm individual top-ups being based on the 
main part of the livestock premia and on the total of milk and sugar premia. The level of 
entitlements  remained  constant  until  2009  (except  the  dynamic  adaptation  due  to  the 
upgrading of milk and sugar premia). From 2010, a progressive adaptation of the entitlement 
levels occurs up to the full harmonisation in 2013.  
Referring to a hypothetical static hybrid model in 2013, the premium level would be 
less than 200 €/ha for 5 % of UAA (Salhofer et al. 2009). For about 75 % of UAA it varies 
between 200 and 400 €/ha, and for about 5 % of UAA it is more than 500 €/ha (Figure 2). 
The latter is true in particular for farms with intensive bull fattening and milk production. 
After  full  conversion  to  regional  flat  rates,  the  entitlement  levels  vary  in  the  scope  of 
administratively settled range. About one quarter of farms can expect considerably higher 
premiums, while in one fifth of farms considerable premium losses are to be expected. The 
regional  implementation  leads  to  considerable  redistributions  of  Direct  Payments  to  the 
disadvantage  of  intensive  beef  fattening  and  dairy  farms.  Also,  a  moderate  regional 
redistribution occurs in favour of extensive and grassland-based cattle farms, as well as less 
favoured regions.  
 
Figure 2. Distribution of entitlement levels related to UAA – hybrid versus regional 
flat rates (2013) Germany 
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Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.  
 EAAE Congress 2011 
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3.2.  Impacts of Direct Payment options with regard to CAP after 2013  
To indicate the combined effects of premium rearrangements, digression and capping 
with reference to manpower, the premium changes are shown in the following graphs as a 
function of premium volumes per farm (referring to national implementation).  
Impacts in Germany 
In Germany, redistributions were mainly realised during the national implementation of 
the regional model mentioned earlier. Distributions induced by a country wide flat rate 
(_MS) are rather low, shown in the top line of Figure 3. Farms with premium levels up to  
5 T€ will have a slight increase of DP, because their location in regions with weak natural 
conditions are favoured by the harmonisation of entitlements. On the other hand, they are 
exempted from digression due to the franchise. Premium digression would impose a slightly 
progressive  reduction  of  Direct  Payments  up  to  22 %.  Capping  of  Direct  Payments  with 
regard to labour use would impose premium reductions up to 43 % in farms with Direct 
Payment levels beyond 100 T€. Although defined for Direct Payments > 50 T€, farms with 
less than 100 T€ are less affected due to their labour input of 2 AWU on average. Larger 
farms in Germany are more specialised in arable cropping with low labour input. Therefore 
Direct  Payments  are  much  higher  than  the  underlying  ceiling  of  15 T€/AWU.  Due  to 
expected large reductions of Direct Payments there is a strong opposition to this measure, 
especially by representatives of the new Laender.  
A global reduction of Pillar-I budget by 20 % (Sc_B-20%) would induce even higher 
premium reductions. The partial effect in small farms is relatively higher than in largest farms 
because  the  capping  effect  would  be  less  under  these  lower  Direct  Payment  levels.  The 
maximum reduction will be 47% for the largest farms.  
Figure 3. Impacts of DP options - Germany 
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An EU-wide flat rate would induce significant reductions of Direct Payment levels in 
Germany, because the Direct Payment level, with 345 €/ha, is significantly above the EU 
average of 266 €/ha. The reduction of Direct Payment level by 23 % would induce almost 
similar effects as a global budget cut mentioned before, with changes of -20 % in small farms 
and of -48 % in largest farms. Average reduction would be 38%; it would rise to almost half 
(and 55 % for largest farms) by an additional global budget cut. 
EU wide effects of Direct Payment options  
Effects of Direct Payment options on net-DP at Member States levels are shown in 
Figure 4. Member States are sorted by Direct Payment levels and aggregated into EU-15 and 
new  Member  States.  Gross  direct  Payment  levels  show  a  broad  variation  between  570 
(Greece) and 170 €/ha (Portugal) in EU-15 and of 490 (Malta) and 83 €/ha (Latvia) in the 
new Member States. Depending on farm size, under conditions of flat rates per Member 
State, the net Direct Payments are reduced up to 30 % by a 20 % global budget cut and 
digression. Germany, Denmark and the United Kingdom would be particularly affected. EU-
wide flat rates would induce considerable redistribution effects between Member States. In 
the EU-15, most Member States would have considerable Direct Payment losses, while about 
half of the new Member States would gain.  
 
Figure 4. Changes of DP by Member States - Sc_B-20% 












































































































Aggregated effects for the rest of EU-15, mainly applying historic or hybrid schemes
8 
in the reference, are shown in Figure 5. As premium reductions/capping are progressive with 
Direct Payment levels of farms, results are aggregated for farms by different payment classes. 
Impacts of flat rates per Member States are similar to Germany due to the implementation 
of the regional model (see Chapter 3.1). Farms with low premium levels will gain a lot. Net 
payments of farms with 20 to 200 T€ of Direct Payments will progressively decrease up to 
                                                       
8 Impacts of Direct Payment options in the UK are similar to Germany and are not shown here.  EAAE Congress 2011 
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25%, while larger farms will lose up to two-thirds. Digression and capping would include a 
further reduction of net-payments.  
EU  wide  flat  rates  will  have  a  further  negative  levelling  effect  because  Direct 
Payment level of two-thirds of EU-15 Member States is above EU-27 average; the gross 
Direct Payment level will be reduced by 11 %. Only farms with less than 5 T€ will be on the 
winner side, while even farms with 10 to 50 T€ of Direct Payment will have premium losses 
of up to 25 %. Losses will progressively increase to more than 75 % in the largest farms.  
 




















































































In the new Member States, effects of national flat rates are rather insignificant as 
most of them apply SAPS (see Figure 6). Net-payments will be progressively reduced by 
digression. The total harmonisation of Direct Payment-levels between Member States via 
EU-wide  flat  rates  would  be  in  favour  of  most  new  Member  States;  the  gross  Direct 
Payment-level would increase by one-third on average. Small farms will gain a lot and farms 
with Direct Payments of 10 to 20 T€ would get higher net-premiums. Due to digression and 
capping and a further budget cut of 20 %, small farms will still be on the winner side, net-
payments in medium sized farms would be slightly negative, while largest farms will have 
losses up to one-third.  EAAE Congress 2011 
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3.3.  Changes of overall distribution of Direct Payments  
Finally the questions arise: to which degree can the distribution of direct payments 
change and can a fairer distribution – as mentioned in the Commissions’ communication – be 
reached. This will be discussed by comparing distributions of the base situation (national 
implementations of SPS and SAPS) and EU-wide flat rates for the whole EU-27 (see Figure 
7). Referring to the base situation (left side of the figure) the distribution shows 3 peaks: one 
in  farms  with  less  than  5  T€  of  Direct  Payments  and  low  rates  referring  to  labour  use. 
Another peak with around 10 to 15 T€ of Direct Payments/AWU is for farms with Direct 
Payment levels of 20 to 100 T€ and a further one with 30 and more T€/AWU for Direct 
Payment levels of > 200 T€ / farm. 
 
Under conditions of Sc_B-20% the distribution of Direct Payments seems to be more 
balanced, but the 3 peaks are still there. The share of farms with 5 to 10 T€/AWU increases 
significantly in groups with less than 5 T€ of Direct Payments. On the other hand, the share 
of farms with high DP/AWU decreases in large farms. Therefore, distribution of DPs is still 
unbalanced, because it is mainly determined by the variation of farms size, especially land 
use.  
Another aspect is the distribution between old and new Member states. In 2013 80 % 
of gross Direct Payment volume is allocated to EU-15 and only one fifth to nMS (Figure 8). 
Under conditions of EU-wide flat rates and of constant budget the absolute share of Direct 
Payments in nMS will increase, while it decreases to less than two-thirds in EU-15. Including 
reduction of global budget by 20%, the total of Direct Payments is only two-thirds of the base 
level, while Direct Payments would be reduced by half in EU-15 and about 18 % remains for EAAE Congress 2011 
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the nMS. Therefore the distribution of Direct Payments between EU-15 and nMS becomes 
more balanced.  
 





























































































Base situation (2013) Flat rate EU Sc_B-20%
Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.  
 
Figure 8. Distribution of DP in the scenarios under EU-wide flatrates 
Source: EU-FADN-DG AGRI L-3; own calculation.















































4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  simulation  based  on  FADN  data  allows  recommendations  on  the  effects  of 
alternative options of decoupled payment schemes. Regional flat rates by Member States lead 
to premium rearrangements within the Member States, especially of EU-15, mainly in favour 
of farms with a low premium volume in the base situation. Redistribution effects are close to 
the German regional model, which is to the disadvantage of intensive beef fattening and dairy 
farms and a moderate regional redistribution in favour of extensive and grassland-based cattle 
farms, as well as less favoured regions.  
Uniform EU-wide flat rates induce clear re-distributions to the disadvantage of most 
EU-15 countries and in favour of most new Member States. Premium restrictions related to 
labour lead to significant reductions for farms with more than 100 T€ of Direct Payments, EAAE Congress 2011 
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above all in Germany. In the new Member States, lower reductions arise from this option, due 
to the higher labour input of those farms.  
Distribution  of  Direct  Payments  between  old  and  new  Member  States  as  well  as 
between  small  and  large  farms  will  become  more  harmonised  by  the  considered  policy 
options. EAAE Congress 2011 
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